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“Are There Any Fs?”: How We Should 
Understand This Question
1.thE optIons
In this paper I will present an approach to ontology which combines realism 
and conceptualism in what, I hope, is an intuitively acceptable way. In order to 
illustrate the advantages of this approach, I shall have to deal somewhat swiftly 
with a number of hot topics, but my objective is not so much to force conclusions 
about those topics as to illustrate the virtues of my fundamental approach to the 
‘are there any Fs?’ question.
I think the question ‘are there Fs?’ can properly be interpreted in either of 
two ways, depending on the F in question. one I call the conceptualist interpre-
tation (CI), and it can be read roughly as follows:
(CI) We have the concept F. Is the world so organized that it satisfies this concept 
in the way that is necessary for the utility of that concept?
If the answer to this is affirmative, then there are Fs, in the conceptualist 
sense.
the other interpretation is realist (rI), and goes roughly as follows.
(rI) Forget about us and our concepts. If there were no conceptualizers around 
(putting god or Divine minds aside) would there be Fs?
If the answer to this is affirmative, then there are Fs in the realist sense.
Common sense does not make this distinction, but I do not think that it finds it 
rebarbative. Why I think this will, I hope, become clear in what follows. nomi-
nalists will find rI objectionable because they will not find the realist view of 
properties and universals entailed by it acceptable. I will not be concerned here 
to engage with nominalism of this sort, for I think that, if there is a world, it 
must be thus and so, and, therefore, it must be characterized by some properties 
independently of our conceptual practices. the nearest I can come to nominal-
ism is (iv) below.
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there are the following positions one might take on adopting the conceptual-
ist and realist positions. .
(i) realism for all standard concepts, including those for natural objects and those 
for artifacts.
(ii) realism applying to natural objects, but not to artifacts, which are treated con-
ceptually.
(iii) realism for objects at the fundamental level but conceptualism for the rest.
(iv) Conceptualism for everything we know and possibly for everything we are 
ever likely to know, or even are capable of knowing. how the world is in itself will 
always evade our grasp: we can only approximate its actual properties.
Most discussion of these issues in modern analytic metaphysics is in what one 
might describe as a ‘mad dog realist‘ spirit, as in (i), and is only interested in rI. 
to say with peter van Inwagen (1990, 109), for example, that there are no tables, 
but only table-shaped arrangements of simples is to ignore CI as a candidate for 
answering the ‘are there any Fs?’ question. Van Inwagen’s position assumes that 
the only interpretation of this question is the strict realist one. If one took CI se-
riously, then it is clear that, in that sense, there are tables, for the world is clearly 
so constructed as to make the application of this concept fruitful. 
2. THe useFulness oF ci For analyTic meTaPHysics
there is a lot to be said for taking CI seriously, for if it were applicable, one 
might solve a whole series of problems that worry modern metaphysicians. 
these problems arise from applying rI across the board. I have already tried 
to show (robinson 2008-9) that CI can be used to deal with vagueness and as-
sociated sorites problems. Many, if not most, concepts outside the most exact 
sciences (which means, I think, outside physics and, possibly, chemistry) are 
subject to such vagueness. In brief, I argued the following. Vagueness (at least 
of the sorites-generating kind) is a property of concepts, not of reality. the re-
sponse to the paradoxes and conflicts with classical logic that vagueness gener-
ates should not be to try to develop a logic for those concepts that produces 
a formally valid natural language, incorporating all its idiosyncrasies, as in a 
three-valued logic, nor to impute to vague concepts a hidden precision, as does 
epistemicism, but to use or refrain from using those concepts according to their 
usefulness, consistent with classical logic. so, for example, when a raised piece 
of earth is neither clearly a hill nor a mountain, one drops these terms and speaks 
in terms of particular heights. I argued that one should think of such concepts as 
belonging to representational ontologies use of which can be dropped when cases 
do not fit their paradigms. the relationship of different ontologies to each other 
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is not random—there is what I called a harmonization requirement between the 
various ontologies we apply that is weaker than a formal logical compatibility. 
For example, newtonian theory and quantum theory are strictly incompatible, 
but one can show how an essentially quantum world can sustain the application 
of newtonian principles at most normal magnitudes. similarly, one can see how 
strictly continuous heights can make useful the categories of hill and mountain 
for many straightforward cases, without needing to define the terms ‘hill’ and 
‘mountain’ strictly in terms of exact heights. Where these categories do not fit, 
the practice of using them is suspended. this can only be done if one treats the 
relevant concepts in a conceptualist way, for the conceptualist holds that the 
‘are there Fs?’ question depends, in part, on whether the world will cooperate 
in the practice of using these concepts, and, where vagueness comes into play, 
it won’t. If one believed these concepts to pick out fundamental constituents of 
the world, then one would not be free simply to drop them out of convenience 
and the full rigours of logical consistency would be brought to bear. some kinds 
of discourse—such as that of bald-not bald, or hill and mountain—were never 
intended as basic, but the newtonian ontology was. to apply it now, it must be 
downgraded to CI.
Vagueness is not the only problem which CI is helpful in handling. here are 
two further examples.
The ‘many Fs’ problem
the ‘many Fs’ problem has two versions, one essentially involving vague-
ness, one not. the vagueness version—in which the F in question is typically 
‘cloud’—concerns objects with indeterminate borders. peter unger (1980) ar-
gues that, in these cases, one can draw the border in many different places, 
thus individuating many overlapping objects. the non-vagueness- involving 
case goes as follows. suppose that a complex physical object—a table, an oak 
tree or a cat - is made of a million atomic parts. there are almost indefinitely 
many sub-groups of those atoms which would be—or are—sufficient to consti-
tute an object of the relevant kind. so, in the case of the table, imagine all its 
atoms minus two which are presently integral to the table—these atoms still 
constitute a table. If pursued, this line of thought leads to the idea that there 
are a vast number of actual tables contained within this one table, though they 
massively overlap. or imagine the tree minus a branch. that would still be 
an oak tree. but that tree-minus-the-branch is present within the actual tree. 
similarly for the cat without one of its paws—or simply without a few hairs or 
the odd atom. there are a tremendous number of proper part combinations suf-
ficient to be an F within the actual F, and, as each of these is sufficient to be an 
F, all those Fs are there and real. 
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the realist has to struggle with the fact that there are many well qualified can-
didates for being an F of the kind in question.  now I am not entirely convinced 
that a realist cannot cope with the non-vague cases, but the conceptualist has an 
easy route. he can simply say that this is not the way we deploy this concept: 
we deem there to be only one F whenever there is an F present and the only 
practical way of treating it is as a single object. this ‘deeming‘ is not a conscious 
choice. given our perceptual system, the table presents itself as unitary and we 
interact with it as one thing. For example, even if there are indefinite number 
of tables present, you cannot do an indefinite number of different things with 
them. so our conceptualization is practical as well as—or, perhaps, rather than—
intellectual. It is a matter of how we interact with the object.
The ‘clay and the statue’ problem
a lump of clay is moulded into a statue of a man. the lump of clay and the 
statue seem to be, in an obvious intuitive sense, the same thing. they occupy 
exactly the same place and two different physical objects cannot occupy the 
same place; they each weigh, say, ten pounds, but their combined weight is only 
ten pounds. nevertheless, they have different identity conditions. the clay can 
be remoulded into something else, and, if this happens, it continues to exist but 
the statue is destroyed.
the realist has a problem with all such relations of constitution, whether or 
not he treats constitution as a form of identity. If only the base is treated in a 
fully realist way, then one can treat the composite object as a convenient way of 
conceptualizing some of what is out there, rather than a further entity.
a natural response to this strategy is to say that, in the case of artifacts, per-
haps we manufacture and control the concept as well as the object, but this is not 
so for natural objects. Maybe there is only one table there because that is how our 
concept of ‘table’ works, and statues only exist, perhaps, because we make them 
and interpret certain lumps of stone as statues, but the situation is different for 
natural objects. there is not only one oak tree or one cat there (if there is only 
one) because of our concepts: we control the reality of tables and statues on all 
levels, but not the reality of trees and cats. 
3. onToloGy anD THe sPecial sciences
Coping with this challenge obliges us to face the question of the ontological sta-
tus of entities dealt with in the special sciences. these seem to be real because 
they seem to cut nature at its joints, even if not at its most microscopic ones. on 
the other hand, if we treat them in a strictly realist way, many of the problems 
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which I have claimed CI solves will appear in their case, for vagueness, constitu-
tion and ‘many Fs’ problems arise for many natural objects.
Considering the ontological status of the “levels” represented by the differ-
ent special sciences, the following seem to be the options.
(1a) all levels are equally real.
(2a) all levels are real, but only the lowest one is fundamental: this does not im-
pune the reality of the others. (If you construct something out of real elements, it 
is real itself, even though derivatively.)
(3a) only the fundamental level is strictly real, the others are to be understood 
conceptually.
these options concern the existence of entities, but similar distinctions might 
be made concerning the genuineness of the causal powers of the different lev-
els. then it would run
(1b) all levels are equally causally efficacious.
(2b) all levels are causally efficacious, but they all draw their efficacy from the laws 
operating at the fundamental level.
(3b) only the fundamental level has any real efficacy; the rest are a mere by-prod-
uct or appearance of effectiveness.
It is natural to pair these two series off together, especially if one thinks that 
causal efficacy is a criterion for being physically real. but if one does not hold 
the latter it is at least possible to claim that all levels are real but that the ener-
gies are all micro-physical. my reason for distinguishing them is that kim states 
his Causal Exclusion principle in terms of causal efficacy; but, as we shall see, it 
is salient for the further question of ontological status. For present purposes, I 
shall be assuming that reality and efficacy stand or fall together.
For present purposes, I shall not distinguish between (1) and (2). Jonathan 
schaffer (2003) has argued that there need not be a basic level and, in that case, 
all are equally real. I shall not pursue that issue here.
two influential figures whose positions naturally favour (3) are armstrong 
and kim. David armstrong (1978) believes that the only real universals are those 
needed for basic science, the rest are downgraded to the status of “predicates”. 
this means that anything except the scientifically fundamental properties are 
the creatures of human thought and language. (It does not seem to be generally 
realized that this has serious consequences for armstrong’s theory of mind; for 
psychological properties will not be basic, and hence will themselves have the 
status of predicates, thus relying for their reification on activities of the human 
mind. this looks like a vicious regress.)
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kim (1998, 2005), too, propounds a principle which can be deployed to sug-
gest that the ontologies of the special sciences have no independent efficacy, 
and this at least prepares the way for denying that they have an independent real 
existence. this principle is the causal exclusion principle, which goes as follows.
If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause 
of e (unless this is a case of genuine causal overdetermination). (kim, 2005, 17)
kim initially uses this to argue that a weak definition of physicalism in terms of 
supervenience cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, but he then considers the gen-
eralization argument, which extends it, given closure under physics, to the special 
sciences. kim rejects this argument, in effect because he does not think that 
different ontological levels are in competition with each other. this is a major 
theme to which we shall return.
4. non-reDucTive PHysicalism METAPHySICAL anD LIGHT
the ontological status of the special sciences can be approached via barry 
loewer‘s discussion of Jerry Fodor’s seemingly extreme realism about the spe-
cial sciences.
in controversy with Jerry Fodor, barry loewer distinguishes between what 
he calls Non-Reductive Physicalism, Metaphysical (NRPM) and Non-Reductive Physi-
calism, Light (NRPL). the latter corresponds to position (3) and the former to the 
stronger realism expressed in (1) and in (2).
NRPM and NRPL agree that the special sciences are conceptually, epistemologi-
cally, and methodologically autonomous/irreducible to physics but disagree about 
what autonomy/irreducibility consists in and how it is to be explained. NRPM says 
that the autonomy/irreducibility is metaphysical and seeks to explain the concep-
tual and epistemological autonomy in terms of the existence of metaphysically ba-
sic special science kinds and laws. on the other hand, NRPL attempts to account 
for the conceptual/methodological irreducibility of the special sciences in terms of 
facts and laws of microphysics and our conceptual endowment and epistemological 
situation in the world...
loewer then raises the question of what the difference would be between a 
world, w1, in which NRPL held and another,w2, in which NRPM obtained. giv-
en closure under physics, everything would behave in exactly the same way, 
so the addition of the further entities and their concomitant laws appears to 
be vacuous.
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Fodor appears to leave himself open to this argument by seeming to concede 
that the existence of two such distinct worlds is possible. taking psychology as 
a case of a special science, he says:
only god gets to decide whether there is anything, and likewise only god gets to 
decide whether there are laws about pains; or whether, if there are, the pains that 
the laws are about are Mr [‘Metaphysically real’].
Fodor here seems to be denying the standard physicalist maxim that once god 
had created all the facts of physics, he had nothing more to do, and this does 
place him in the bizarre situation that loewer points out. it is more natural for 
the realist about the special sciences to deny that w1 is possible, on the grounds 
that, once it has been created, the higher order entities and concomitant laws 
are, eo ipso present too. It is a case of what has been called an ‘ontological free 
lunch’.
this last phrase might still leave one puzzled over what the difference be-
tween the “light” and the “metaphysical” consists in. asserting that it means 
that a further set of entities exist, without any consequences, makes the asser-
tion look suspiciously empty. the expression ‘ontological free lunch’ itself sug-
gests something very dubious, namely that there both is, and is not, something 
more.
the idea that there is something more might be summed up by the idea that 
Fs are wholly constituted by atoms, but that they are not nothing but atoms. What 
then, is the “more” of their nature, over and above how they are constituted?
5. aTTemPTs To DeFenD THe realiTy oF orGanisms.
I can think of two answers to the question with which the last section ended. 
one is that the identity conditions of the higher order entities are missing from 
facts about constitution. but the ontological status of identity conditions, con-
sidered as real entities “out there” seems very dubious. such conditions are 
most naturally seen as conditions for the application of a concept, and, as such, play 
into the hands of the conceptualist and position (3).
another, more prima facie realist option, is what has been called a modern 
version of hylomorphism. the core of this idea is to take structure or organization 
as ontologically basic. the term hylomorphism of course originates with aristotle, 
but the modern theory is simply about taking macro organization at face value 
and so treating it as being real and efficacious as the microscopic features. noth-
ing exclusively aristotelian or scholastic need be invoked.
this idea is very clearly articulated in Jaworski (2010): 
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Hylomorphism claims …[t]hat structure is a basic ontological and explanatory prin-
ciple. (269)
structure is also a basic explanatory principle in the sense that it explains why 
members of this or that kind are able to engage in the behaviors they do. It is be-
cause humans are organized as they are, for instance, that they are able to speak, 
to learn, and to engage in the range of activities that distinguish them from other 
living things and from non-living ones. (272)
Hylomorphism implies…that there are two distinct kinds of properties: proper-
ties due to something’s structure and properties things possess independently of a 
broader structure.
the properties of these structures are not idle, according to Jaworski:
emergent properties are not epiphenomenal…but make a distinctive causal or ex-
planatory contribution to a system’s behavior…
he emphasizes this point: 
Emergent [hylomorphic] properties are not logical constructions out of lower-level 
properties; they do not represent abstract ways of describing lower-level occur-
rences or processes. (274)
according to Jaworski, from this follows what might seem to be a direct denial of 
the causal exclusion principle:
hylomorphists endorse causal pluralism. they claim that there are causal proper-
ties and relations that do not fit the mold set by physics…[this] view is compatible 
with all forces operating at a fundamental physical level [i.e., none at other levels] 
and is therefore immune to the empirical objections raised against emergentism. 
(290-1)
this last quotation is particularly important. In ascribing to causal pluralism, 
the hylomorphist appears to be denying kim’s causal exclusion principle. but 
notice that the avowal of causal pluralism is immediately followed by the asser-
tion that “all forces are operating at a fundamental physical level”(italics added). 
What one has, in fact, is an explanatory pluralism, with causation adopted into the 
domain of explanation; the wholly external, mind-free element is force and this 
is exclusively at the micro level. Causal exclusion has been replaced by force 
exclusion, and explanatory pluralism is now characterized as, or as including, 
plural causal explanation. but no-one thought that explanations, of all levels, 
excluded an appeal to causation. Jaworski is really only claiming that, once one 
realizes that most explanations are causal explanations, explanatory pluralism is 
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pluralism enough to constitute or ground a full realism about all levels. this sits 
well with kim’s belief that different ontological levels are not in competition 
with each other. 
nevertheless, this position might be defended. the truth makers for higher-
level explanations are just as real as those for physics. If bricks are real, then so 
is a house made of bricks. and if bricks have causal powers, so does the house, in 
virtue of the bricks’ powers. so if atoms have real force, combinations of atoms 
can constitute a real object which has real causal efficacy compounded from the 
real forces of the atoms of which it is made. this seems to be common sense. 
kim states the commonsensical nature of this position emphatically:
the errant baseball didn’t after all break the window, and the earthquake did not 
cause the buildings to collapse! this strikes us as intolerable. (1998, 81)
this much is true, but the impression that it assists the realist is an illusion, for 
these truths are neutral between conceptualist and realist interpretations. the 
same argument could be brought for realism about vague concepts—house and 
heap are probably both examples—and vagueness is certainly best handled by 
treating the concepts in a conceptualist manner. the baseball broke the win-
dow, but both ‘baseball’ and ‘window’ are to be understood in the conceptualist 
sense. so if one adopts CI as appropriate for such concepts, there are baseballs 
etc., but in the conceptualist sense. similarly for the earthquake and the build-
ings. only an extreme realist would feel that common sense was threatened by 
this reading. kim’s earthquake and van inwagen’s table both exist, but on the 
conceptualist interpretation of what it is to exist. What is at stake is whether the 
human perspective has a certain role in reifying what is in fact the micro world 
in the way we do. there is a sense in which any mereological combination of at-
oms could be treated as an entity and so could the combined sum of their forces. 
Which are chosen are a matter of human interest and perspective—not arbitrary, 
of course, but well-groundedness of conceptual practice does not entail a strict 
realism. talk of “human interests” might make it seem too intellectual. one 
of the most important things is the grain of human perception—what is salient 
to us and how it manifests itself in our senses. If we can see the independent 
constituents of an entity, we are less likely to think of that entity as basic. We 
can see the elements in a crowd, in a swarm of bees or in a weather system, and 
so are less likely to think of these things as fundamental, even if they seem to 
have a dynamic of their own. We are generally happy to make a conceptualist in-
terpretation of them. but for most organisms, we see them only whole, for such 
parts as we do see are essentially parts of the thing—branches, leaves, limbs, 
teeth etc.—not independent parts. If we saw a plant as a swirling mass of par-
ticles passing in and out of an organizational vortex, like a rioting crowd, then, 
once we came to believe that the organization was a product of the interaction 
64 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
of the particles following only the laws of physics and not an extraneous imposi-
tion, we would probably find it natural to make a conceptualist interpretation of 
plants. as it is, the nature of our perception seems to endow them with a greater 
degree of natural integrity than they would seem to possess from a more micro-
scopic viewpoint. 
both as entities and as causal agents, macroscopic objects seem to be by-
products of their micro constituents. What does it mean to call the higher order 
processes ‘by-products’? It rests on the premise that everything that happens, 
happens because of the micro-dynamics. apparent higher laws, though useful 
generalizations from our standpoint, do not give the real reason why anything 
happened. It is like the case of the plant “turning towards the light”. Common 
experience leads us to say that it does so in order to gain more light, because it 
needs light to survive and replicate. but science tells us that this turning hap-
pens because of the chemical reactions involved, without any fundamental tel-
eology. but were not these chemical processes “selected” because they allowed 
the plant to get the light and thus teleology is restored at the level of biology? 
yes, in a sense, but only in the sense that certain micro-processes, from their 
own dynamics, repeat themselves in a certain way. the micro- processes do not 
get repeated because they lead to the replication of the organism, their repeating 
themselves is the replication. Dawkins’ expression “the blind watchmaker” as 
a label for nature is illuminating. the “blindness” in question is not primarily 
cognitive, it is volitional. nature does not intend to produce watches—or eyes or 
organisms in general—the developing of the quantum field, which is “blind to” 
its by-products, merely produces things which can be usefully so classified from 
the perspective of a macroscopic rational animal.
Davidson (2003) rejects kim’s exclusion principle, but, rather ironically, we 
can draw on a legitimate point of Davidson’s in its support. Davidson claims, 
very plausibly, that it is only at the fundamental level that there are what he calls 
strict laws. laws at other levels involve ceteris paribus clauses and a certain degree 
of approximation. this strongly suggests that, though they are useful explanato-
ry tools, formulated on the basis of more exact processes that underlie them, the 
laws of the special sciences are not entities in their own right. It would be natural 
to argue the same way for the entities to which those laws attach. Davidson’s 
reason for rejecting the exclusion principle rests on some very controversial fea-
tures of his position. he claims that causal relations are entirely extensional and 
so events are not efficacious in virtue of any of the properties involved in them, 
so you cannot claim that some of them are active and others idle. the motive 
behind this is some kind of nominalism that wishes to treat properties as simply 
“descriptions” under which events fall, and, as such, not agents in the world. 
at the same time, he wants to treat the mental as “purely conceptual”, and the 
basic physical as, in some sense, more real. For further discussion of Davidson’s 
confusions, see robinson (2003).
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6. concePTualism anD relaTive iDenTiTy
David Wiggins has demonstrated, in a masterfully developed series of mono-
graphs (Wiggins 1967, 1980, 2001) that the logic of identity, with leibniz’s law, 
rules out the possibility of relative identity. the doctrine of conceptualism for 
all ordinary entities that I have defended seems likely to leave open the possi-
bility of relative identity, because the same piece of the material world might be 
conceptualized in different ways for different purposes. but what Wiggins actu-
ally shows is that the relativity of identity is impossible within any given repre-
sentational ontology, but if the concepts in question are ones the use of which 
one can suspend, they need not be made formally consistent with other repre-
sentational ontologies that one might choose to employ. one always has the op-
tion to withdraw the conceptualization that is leading to trouble and adopt one 
that is more appropriate or basic. on the other hand, if the entities in question are 
taken in a strictly realist sense then one is bound by Wiggins’s argument. so what 
Wiggins says must be applied if you think that the entities under discussion are 
fundamental and interpreted according to rI. Wiggins, as a good aristotelian, 
thinks that ordinary macroscopic objects—especially biological organisms—are 
paradigms of fundamental substances and so his logical constraints must apply 
to them. I have been arguing that they are not, in the appropriate sense, funda-
mental and that that is why Wiggins’s logical discipline does not apply.1 (I shall 
suggest at the end that there may not be in the physical world anything of the 
kind on which Wiggins’s arguments can get a substantial grip. as (iv) above sug-
gests, perhaps it is the case that everything on which we can get a grip must be 
understood according to CI.)
7. concePTualism anD THe minD.
Does this solve the problem of organisms—oak trees, cats, and, worse, other 
human beings? 
Maybe what I have said so far is satisfactory for vegetable organisms, but what 
about animals, like cats, that are normally thought of as conscious, and what 
about human beings?
the answer to this will depend to a great extent on whether one is a physi-
calist. Considered as a nonconscious organism, an animal would be in the same 
category as a plant, namely a vortex of changing atoms formed entirely in ac-
1  i say ‘in the appropriate sense’, because, as i argue in robinson 2004/9, i think that there 
are two essential components to the traditional conception of substance, one that I call ‘de-
scriptive’ and the other ‘teleological’. Wiggins wishes aristotle had ignored the latter, whereas 
what he tried to do was to give it dominance. It is to the descriptive conception, when taken 
realistically, that Wiggins’s arguments most certainly apply.
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cord with the laws of microphysics. seeing this as an entity which is more than 
a highly organized cloud of particles would depend on our finding ourselves 
conceptualizing it as such, as with the oak tree. but isn’t the cat’s conscious-
ness real in a way that is independent of our conceptualization? the correct 
answer is, I think, ‘yes’, but it is difficult to see how this could be the case if 
the cat’s subjectivity were not something over and above the organization of 
elementary particles in its brain. It is not my purpose here to engage deeply 
with the philosophy of mind, but I shall briefly give reasons for this claim. If it is 
right that, in general, organic life is to be interpreted conceptually, as our way of 
making sense of certain patterns which are a by-product of development at the 
micro level—say in the quantum field—as presented through our senses, then 
the same will apply to subsystems within organic life. thus it applies to neural 
processes, especially as functionally understood. this leads us to the self-under-
mining position to which (as I said earlier) armstrong is committed. the very 
engine that is responsible for conceptualization—the human mind—is itself a 
unit only within the light of conceptual activity. this is the same problem as the 
one that faces Dennett’s interpretationalist stance, and I have argued against it 
elsewhere (robinson 1993: 6 and, in more detail, 2010), as have others (hornsby 
1997, 181-2). so here I shall simply assume that conscious states are fundamen-
tal in at least a property dualist sense. these mental states will be “out there” 
in a fully realist sense, in the same way as whatever constitutes the fundamental 
level of matter. but will the cat’s mind, considered as a complex entity, also 
be real or will it depend on our reifying it by one of our concepts? Is there, for 
example, a ‘many minds’ problem corresponding to the ‘many bodies’ problem, 
if one tries to be a realist about minds? remember that the ‘many Fs’ problem 
has two forms. one of them depends on the vagueness of the boundaries of 
most bodies. It is plausible to deny that minds are vague in this sense. If M is a 
mental state, then there must be some mind to which it belongs. this will not 
be true for a pure humean, for on that theory, an impression can exist independ-
ently, detached from any mind and, therefore, presumably, in an indeterminate 
relation to a given mind—half attached, like a hair that is falling out or a water 
droplet at the margins of a cloud. I shall simply assume that this cannot be true 
of mental states. one may be only vaguely aware of some states, but, insofar 
as it counts as mental, it belongs to some particular mind. this still leaves the 
non-vague version of the ‘many Fs’ problem. after all, if you take all the cat’s 
mental states and think away one sensation, you still have a feline mind, so are 
there not many cat-minds present? I had said when introducing this problem in 
section 2 that I was not certain that there might not be a realist solution to it. In 
the case of minds, I think there certainly is. Insofar as it is determinate whether 
a certain mental state belongs to a given mind, then one can insist on a maximal 
criterion for the identity of a mind: it consists of all the mental states that are co-
conscious. that very mind could have contained one mental state less, but it does 
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contain all the actually co-conscious ones. (see kovacs 2010 for an argument that 
this is inconsistent with the supervenience of the mental on the physical.)
so the answer is that the mind as a whole will be real and unitary provided 
that the co-consciousness relation and its scope are real independently of our 
conceptualization. the cat will then have only one body not—or not primarily—
because of the way we conceptualize it, but because the one consciousness of 
the cat acts upon it as a single object. the cat does not have to manoeuvre a set 
of bodies, as if it were herding sheep. so the cat’s agency does for it something 
parallel to what our intelligent interaction with the world does for us. the same 
line of argument as the one applied to cats, applies to humans. and the individu-
ality or uniqueness of one’s body is the result of the fact that one thinks of it and 
acts upon it as a unity.
8. conclusion - anD beyonD.
We have seen that taking a conceptualist stand to most if not all non-basic on-
tologies makes intuitive sense and contributes towards solving several of the 
problems that worry contemporary analytic metaphysicians. but it comes at a 
cost, namely that the mind or mental states must be counted amongst the things 
that are basic and so this approach is not open to a standard physicalist. the 
thinking, conceptualizing subject must be amongst those things that are real in 
the strongest sense.
as a final thought I want to return to the final option that I offered above 
concerning degrees of realism, which was:
(iv) Conceptualism for everything we know and possibly for everything we are 
ever likely to know, or even are capable of knowing. how the world is in itself will 
always evade our grasp: we can only approximate its actual properties.
the discussion so far has been conducted within the scope of the assumption 
that we can be realists about the basic physical level. this idea is encouraged 
by our anachronistic but almost automatic assumption that classical atomism of 
some sort provides the model for the basic level. but we know that this is not re-
alistic and our failure to be able to model intuitively quantum reality—the best 
we can manage is as a blur of wave and particle—means that our strictly realistic 
representational ontology of the basic level is purely formal and mathematical. all 
the conceptual categories of our normal ontology, such as that of objects and 
even of discrete events, may be conceptual impositions on a reality that does not 
quite fit any of them in itself. the logical discipline of a strict realism may be 
attenuated for all the categories that we can apply to the external world.
68 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
biblioGraPHy
armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge university press, Cam-
bridge.
Davidson, D., 2003. ‘thinking Causes’, in Mental  Causation, eds J. heil and a. Mele, Claren-
don press, oxford, pp. 3-17.
Jaworski, W., 2010. Philosophy of Mind: a comprehensive introduction, Wiley-blackwell, Malden,
kim, J., 1998. Mind in a Physical World: an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation, 
MIt press, Cambridge Mass.
kim, J.,   2005. Physicalism or Something Near Enough, princeton university press, princeton 
n.J..
kovacs, D., 2010, ‘is there a conservative solution to the many thinkers problem?’, Ratio, vol. 
23, 275-90.
loewer, b., 2008. Why is There anything except Physics?”, Synthese …
robinson, h., 2003. Introduction to Objections to Physicalism, ed. h. robinson, Clarendon 
press, oxford.
robinson, h., 2002.‘Davidson and non-reductive physicalism: a tale of two cultures’, Physi-
calism and Its Discontents, ed. barry loewer and carl Gillet, cambridge university Press, 
Cambridge, 129-51.
robinson, H., 2003/9. ‘substance’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. e. zalta.
         “            2008-9   ‘vagueness, realism, language and Thought’, in Proceedings of the Ar-
istotelian Society, vol.CIX,, 83-101.
robinson, h., 2010. ‘Quality, thought and consciousness’, in The Metaphysics of Consciousness, 
royal insitute of Philosophy supplement 67, eds P. basile, J. kiverstein, P. Phemester, 
Cambridge university press, Cambridge, 203-16.
schaffer, J., 2003. ‘Is there a fundamental level?’Noûs 37.3, 498-517.
Wiggins, D., 1967. Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity, blackwell, oxford
       “             1980. Sameness and Substance, harvard university press, Cambridge Mass..
       “             2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge university press, Cambridge.
unger, p., 1980. the problem of the Many, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 411–67.
van Inwagen, p., 1990. Material Beings, Cornell university press, Ithaca, n.y..
